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 In the economic literature we can identify 
six  widely  used  indices  or  measures  for 
legal independence: Bade & Parkin (1988); 
Alesina (1988, 1989); Grilli, Masciandaro & 
Tabellini  (1991);  Eijffinger  &  Schaling 
(1993); Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman, 
Webb & Neyapti (1992). All these indices of 
legal central bank independence exhibit in-
verse and significant relation with inflation 
in industrialized countries but not in devel-
oping countries. In developing countries, the 
actual  practices  and  norms  in  central 
banking  may  not  replicate  the  central 
banking law, contrary to the case of devel-
oped countries. Cukierman (1992), Cukier-
man et al. (1992) and Cukierman and Webb 
(1995)  developed  three  behaviourally  ori-
ented  indices  for  measuring  central  bank 
independence in emerging countries. These 
three indices are: a questionnaire – based 
index form identifying deviations of the legal 
position  from  actual  practice,  the  actual 
turnover rate of central bank governors and the political vulnera-
bility of central bank governor which are used as proxies for actual 
independence  of  central  banks,  particularly  in  developing  coun-
tries. The first section of the paper reveals the most important in-
dices  for  measuring  central  bank  independence  in  developed 
countries and in developing countries. In the second section of the 
paper I use the new index for central bank independence and in-
flation targeting for measuring these important aspects in three 
groups  of  countries:  developed  countries,  developing  countries 
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1.  Theoretical Assessments Regarding Central 
Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting 
Central bank independence is designed to insulate the 
central  bank  for  the  short –  term  and  often  myopic 
political pressures associated with the electoral cycle. 
Elected  officials  have  incentives  to  deliver  benefits 
before the next election even if the associated costs 
might  make  them  undesirable  from  a  longer  –  term 
perspective.  This  phenomenon  has  been  called  the 
political business cycle in which pre-election stimulus 
leads to higher inflation followed by monetary restraint 
after the elections (Crispin, 2006; Pollard, 2003). 
In our opinion the logic of central bank independence 
can  be  noticed  by  looking  at  the  different  views  of 
elected politicians and of central bank decision makers. 
Democratic leaders run for office promising change and 
improvement  rather  than  continuity  and  stability, 
whereas an incoming head of a central bank will almost 
certainly want to continue the policies of a successful 
predecessor and will emphasize his or her commitment 
to  do  so.  Political  independence  and  non-partisan 
monetary policy provide the promise of monetary policy 
stability over time, which in turn stabilizes expectations 
in  asset  market.  Such  stability  and  continuity  are 
essential for a successful monetary policy. 
Central  bank  independence  requires  that  the  head  of 
the bank has a term of office long enough to prevent 
government revision of the monetary policy decisions. 
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However,  such  structural  features  of  central  bank’s 
institutional design are only the starting point for central 
bank  independence.  If  the  government  publicly  attacks 
the  central  bank’s  policies,  then  the  independence  will 
certainly be incomplete. 
Another very important aspect highlighted in the literature 
on  central  bank  independence  represents  the  legalistic 
illusion debated by André Orléan (2008), which views the 
enforcement of law as the main source of credibility. Its 
most visible manifestation can be found in the importance 
attached  to  the  statute  of  central  banks.  Thus,  for 
example,  most  of  the  indicators  able  to  measure  the 
independence  of  central  banks  are  constructed  by 
encoding  legal  data,  and  especially  their  statute.  This 
legalistic  conception  has  already  been  the  object  of 
criticisms (Cukierman, 1994; Forder, 1996; King, 2001). It 
had been pointed out that a wide discrepancy can exist 
between  de  jure  independence,  as  measured  by  these 
indicators,  and  de  facto  independence,  as  revealed  by 
actual behaviour. Two explanations might exist: either the 
incompleteness  of  the  law,  with  grey  areas  in  the 
definition  of  rights  and  obligations,  or  structural  and 
significant differences between the provisions of the law 
and actual practices. 
In addition, the government must be constrained to act 
according  to  law.  The  government,  as  trustee  of 
sovereignty, possesses not only a whole arsenal of means 
of exerting pressure, but also considerable prerogatives in 
legislative matters. At the very least, it retains the capacity 
to pass new laws. Thus, the aptitude of laws to subjugate 
the sovereign government credibly appears to be highly 
questionable.  There  are  a  number  of  examples  where 
governments  have  contravened  constitutional  clauses 
without any difficulty. 
The inflation targeting regime recognizes the importance 
of  the  inflationary  phenomenon  in  modern  economies, 
and,  implicitly,  the  fact  that  ensuring  price  stability 
represents the most efficient way for the monetary policy 
to  sustain  the  overall  objective  of  long-term  economic 
growth. After being widely used in industrialized countries 
in the 1990s, the direct inflation targeting strategy has 
become, in the aftermath of the Latin American and Asia 
crisis, an attractive alternative for emerging countries as 
well.   
King (2002) show that not only has inflation been lower 
since  inflation  targeting  was  introduced,  but  that,  as 
measured by its standard deviation, it has also been more 
stable  than  in  recent  decades.  Moreover,  inflation  has 
been less persistent – in the sense that shocks to inflation 
die away more quickly – under inflation targeting than for 
most of the past century. 
For some performance measures, both inflation targeters 
and  nontargeters  improve  over  time,  but  the  improve-
ments are larger for targeters. For example, average infla-
tion  fell  both  groups  between  the  pretargeting  and 
targeting  periods,  but  the  average  for  targeters  went 
above  that  of  nontargeters  to  roughly  the  same.  These 
findings have led authors such as Neumann and von Ha-
gen (2002) argue that inflation targeting promotes “con-
vergence”: it helps poorly performing countries catch up 
with countries that are already doing well.  
As the International Monetary Fund stresses to countries 
that are considering the adoption of inflation targeting, the 
keys  to  success  are  transparency  and  accountability. 
Carson,  Enoch  &  Dziobek  (2002)  suggest  that  once  a 
political  decision  has  been  taken  to  make  the  inflation 
target the primary objective of monetary policy, it is crucial 
for the monetary authorities to keep the public regularly 
informed about the actions they have taken to meet that 
objective  and  the  basis  for  the  adjustments  that  they 
make. Perhaps even more than other monetary regimes, 
inflation targeting obliges the central bank to safeguard its 
credibility in pursuing the inflation goal. For this reason, 
inflation targeters are almost invariably countries in which 
the central bank has a high degree of independence. But 
it  is  also  important  to  avoid  a  deflationary  bias,  which 
would  impose  unnecessary  costs  on  society  and  risk 
undermining the political basis for the inflation – targeting 
regime and the independence of the central bank. 
The  motivations  for  inflation  –  targeting  approach  have 
been varied. In a number of cases, such as those of the 
United Kingdom and Sweden, the collapse of an exchange 
rate  peg  led  the  monetary  authorities  to  search  for  an 
alternative nominal anchor for monetary policy, a way of 
reassuring  the  public  that  monetary  would  remain 
disciplined. The demise of a    fixed – exchange – rate 
regime  similarly  motivated  the  adoption  of  a  money  – 
focused approach by Germany in the mid-1970s. Some 
countries,  such  as  Canada,  came  to  inflation  targeting 
after  unsuccessful  attempts  to  use  a  money-targeting 
approach. For example, in the case of Canada, by 1980 
inflation was as high as it was in 1975 (10 percent per 
year) despite adherence to monetary targets that lead to 
lower  money  growth  (Howitt,  1993).  In  other  cases, 
countries with tight monetary policies were successful in 
reducing  their  core  rate  of  inflation  adopted  inflation 
targeting regime as an institutional means of locking in 
their inflation gains. 
2. Legal Indices of Central Bank Independence 
The  empirical  findings  suggest  that  countries  with 
independent central banks can achieve a lower level of the 
inflation rate without economic costs in terms of economic 
growth or output volatility. Regarding this aspect, the most 
empirical studies sustain a negative relationship between 
central  bank  independence  and  inflation.  This  is  the 
consequence  of  the  different  measure  and  indices  of 
central  bank  independence.  As  a  consequence,  central 
bank  independence  is  measured  with  legal  indices  in 
developed countries, while in developing countries central 
bank independence is measured with informal indices. It  MEASURING CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION TARGETING  
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seems to be hardly any correlation regarding central bank 
independence  and  economic  growth  or  output  volatility. 
Some studies reveal a relationship between central bank 
independence and disinflation; considering this fact it is 
questionable the soundness of these correlations between 
central  bank  independence,  economic  growth,  and  the 
costs  of  disinflation.  Other  studies  have  questioned  the 
consistency of the central bank independence indices, the 
statistical  associations  and  the  causality  relationships 
between them. 
Bade & Parkin (1988) index was the first attempt in order 
to  measure  central  bank  independence;  the  model 
consists  in  two  main  parts:  a  political  index  and  an 
economic index. This was the first empirical study in the 
economic literature regarding central bank independence 
and  analyzing  twelve  industrial  countries1  in the period      
1972  –  1986.  For  measuring  political  central  bank 
independence  Bade  &  Parkin  (1988)  study  the  legal 
provisions of the twelve central bank laws, considering the 
following criteria: 
  the central bank is the final monetary authority; 
  there  is  a  government  member  in  the  central 
bank’s board with voting right; 
  some  members  of  the  central  bank  council  are 
appointed independent from the government. 
For measuring financial central bank independence Bade 
& Parkin (1988) adopt several important criteria regarding 
some aspects as: 
  the central bank is independent in establishing its 
own spending and revenue budget; 
  the central bank is capable to hold the authority in 
establishing  the  salaries  and  other  financial 
payments to its own staff; 
  the central bank is autonomous in establishing the 
authority  and  exclusivity  regarding  the  profit 
allocation of the central bank. 
The political and economical central bank independence 
indices of Bade and Parkin (1988) take values between 1 
– the minimum level of independence, and 4 – the maxi-
mum level of independence, a higher value representing a 
higher degree of central bank independence. 
Alesina (1988, 1989) expands the Bade & Parkin (1988) 
index taking into account 17 developed countries in the 
period 1973 – 1986, index which is followed by Alesina & 
Grilli (1992) index for measuring political and economical 
central bank independence. Eijffinger & Schalling (1993) 
revealed  the  importance  of  the  political  central  bank 
independence,  according  to  these  authors  both  central 
bank  and  the  government  can  partly  maintain  the 
authority. 
                                                 
1 The countries included in Bade & Parkin (1988) study are:  Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, Great Britain and USA. 
In 1991 Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini have developed a 
new index for measuring central bank legal independence, 
index which is more complex than Bade & Parkin (1988) 
index;  the  Grilli,  Masciandaro  &  Tabellini  (1991)  index 
measures 18 developed countries2 in the period 1950 – 
1987 and is made up of two parts: an economic index and 
a political index. 
The Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini (1991) economic index 
can be attacked if the central bank has an active role in 
the supervisory activities, if the central bank can directly 
or  indirectly  finance  the  government  budgetary  deficits, 
the lack of autonomy regarding the establishment of the 
discount rates, the lending limitations and the terms of 
government lending. 
Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini define political central bank 
independence as the central bank ability in establishing 
the monetary policy objectives autonomous and without 
government  intervention.  The  authors  consider  as  very 
important, regarding central bank political independence, 
some aspects as: the Governor’s and the board members’ 
appointing  and  dismissal  procedures,  the  tenure  of  the 
central  bank  Governor  and  the  board  members,  the 
government right in deciding on it’s necessary members in 
the  central  bank  board,  the  central  bank  authority  in 
formulating the monetary policy and the importance of the 
statutory objective of price stability as the final objective of 
the  monetary  policy;  a  very  important  aspect  regarding 
political  independence  is  the  prevalence  of  the  central 
bank over the Government in case of policy conflicts. 
The  most  comprehensive  indices  for  measuring  central 
bank independence are those established by Cukierman 
(1992) and Cukierman, Webb & Neyapti (1992). The LVAU 
index is constructed as follow: in the first place takes into 
account a restrain and precise characteristics; second, for 
every central bank independence variable it is assign a 
numerical value; in this sense are taken into account only 
those  relevant  information  which  are  stipulated  in  the 
statute  of  the  central  bank.  The  complementary 
information  regarding  the  application  of  the  law  is 
voluntary  excluded  and  later  combined  into  a  different 
index category. These principles which are characterized 
by  a  high  degree  of  subjectivity  make  possible  the 
analyses of the central banks through the degree of their 
independence.  The  LVAU  variables  can  be  divided  into 
four groups: 
  variables regarding the appointment and dismissal 
procedures  and  the  tenure  of  the  central  bank 
Governor; 
  variables  regarding  conflicts  resolution  between 
government and central bank as well as the central 
                                                 
2 The countries included into Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini (1991) study 
are:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  France,  Germany, 
Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  The  Netherlands,  New  Zeeland,  Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland, Great Britain and USA.    Florin Cornel DUMITER 
bank  degree  of  participating  in  monetary  policy 
formulation and the budgetary process. 
  the  final  objectives  of  the  central  bank  in 
compliance with it’s statue; 
  limitations  on  government’s  lending;  these 
restrictions  regard  limitation  on  non-securitized 
lending and on advances, the terms of lending and 
the maturity of loans.  
Analyzing  the  Cukierman  (1992)  LVAU  index  we  can 
observe the sixteen variables of the legal independence 
varying between 0 (the lowest level of independence) and 
1 (the higher level of independence). The degree of the 
legal  central  bank  independence  varies  because  of  the 
quality of the data regarding the similar characteristics of 
the variables. 
Together with the LVAU – the un-weighted coefficient of 
the legal central bank independence, Cukierman, Webb & 
Neyapti  (1992)  have  developed  LVAW  –  the  weighted 
coefficient  of  the  legal  central  bank  independence 
presented in table 1. 
3. Indicators Based on Actual Behaviour 
Reviewing the economic literature we can sustain that the 
legal  statute  of  a  central  bank  is  just  one  of  the 
determinants  of  the  actual  central  bank  independence. 
Although  central  bank  laws  vary  regarding  their 
complexity, many of those are incomplete and give space 
to misinterpretation.  As a consequence, factors like the 
personal characteristics of the central bank Governor and 
of  other  central  bankers  influence  the  level  of  actual 
central bank independence. In these cases, even if the 
law is very explicit, this law might be non-operational if it 
can  be  identified  a  tradition  or  an  agreement  with  the 
government that those two aspects must be different. An 
explicit example is Argentina, where the tenure of central 
bank Governor stipulated in central bank’s charter is six 
years. In this case we can identify an informal tradition – 
the  Governor  of  the  central  bank  of  Argentina  it  is 
supposed  to  resign  if  there  are  changes  within  the 
Government or the Finance Ministry – the Governors of 
Argentina adhere to this tradition a long time ago. In this 
sense, the average tenure of the central bank Governor of 
Argentina was 10 months in the late 1980’s, while in the 
period  1996  –  2007  the  tenure  was  17  months. 
Obviously,  it  can  be  seen  a  lower  level  of  central  bank 
actual independence of Argentina in compliance with the 
medium term of Governor tenure stipulated in the central 
bank statue – six years. This way we have come to the 
conclusion  that  there  exists  a  gap  between  the  legal 
central bank independence indices and the actual central 
bank independence indices. The core argument for these 
hypotheses  is  the  difficulty  in  identifying  the  systematic 
indices of the actual central bank independence in those 
situations in which legal independence is different from 
the  actual  independence.  In  this  regard,  for  a  more 
comprehensive  analysis  of  the  central  bank  actual 
independence  we  will  present  and  identify  the  informal 
indicators of the actual central bank independence. 
In trying to identify the differences between central bank 
actual  and  legal  independence  Cukierman  (1992)  and 
Cukierman, Webb & Neyapti (1992) have determined the 
turnover  rate  of  central  bank  governors  for  a  period 
between 1950 and 1989. This indicator suggests that a 
higher degree of changes of the central bank governors 
imply a lower level of central bank independence. Long 
term tenure of the central bank Governor does not imply a 
higher degree of central bank independence, instead the 
tenures  with  a  lower  average  than  the  political  cycle 
implies personal independence. The turnover rate of the 
central  bank  governors  represents  the  average  of  the 
changes in central bank governors over a period during a 
year,  more  exactly  TOR = 1 / average  tenure;  this  fact 
implies  medium  results  between  0.2  and  0.25,  higher 
levels  meaning  the  compromising  of  the  central  bank 
independence. 
Regarding the aspect mentioned above it can be observed 
that  central  bank  independence  is  lower  when  the 
turnover rates of the central bank governors are very high. 
  Table 1 
Weights used in the construction of the LVAW index 
 
Variable  Weight 
Governor   0.20 
Policy formulation  0.15 
Objectives  0.15 
Limitations on lending – advances  0.15 
Limitations on lending – securitized  0.10 
Limitations on lending – who decides  0.10 
Limitations on lending – width  0.05 
Limitations on lending – miscellaneous  0.10 
  1.00 
   
Source: Cukierman et al. (1992). 
 
  MEASURING CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION TARGETING  
IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
One  of  the  reasons  for  this  fact  is  that  in  most  of  the 
countries with high turnover rates, the average tenure of 
the  central  bank  Governor  is  lower  than  the  average 
tenure of the Government. For this reason, we consider 
that  there  is  a  high  possibility  that  the  central  bank 
Governor  can  be  influenced  by  the  executive  branch, 
preventing the central bank Governor from implementing 
long  term  monetary  policies.  The  medium  values  are 
between  0.2  and  0.25  because  in  most  countries  the 
political  cycle  varies  between  four  and  five  years. 
Additionally,  for  three  years  or  less  average  tenures  of 
central bank Governor, it is very difficult for any political 
cycle to implement long term policies.  
Cukierman  &  Webb  (1995)  developed  the  political 
vulnerability  coefficient  of  the  central  bank  which  is 
defined  as  the  political  transaction  report  of  a  country 
which  is  followed  (in  six  months  or  in  a  month)  by  a 
replacement of the central bank Governor.  
The  authors  sustain  that  a  political  vulnerability  is 
established when the frequency of the Governor changes 
reflects  changes  within  the  government,  like  an 
appointment of a new chief of the government.   
 
The  political  vulnerability  coefficient  is  similar  with  the 
turnover  rate  of  central  bank  Governor  in  the  political 
periods these two indices are equal when the unit of value 
have been equal to the entire political period, for example 
7 months, and if neither one of the political parties of a 
country have not been truncate by the end of the analyzed 
period, or if there can be observed a very quick change of 
a political regime. 
Cukierman  &  Webb  (1995)  have  been  taken  into 
consideration  67  countries,  34  developed  and  43 
developing, for a period between 1950 and 1989 in which 
the turnover  rate  of the central bank Governor is more 
comprehensive than the political changes. 
It can be observed some important differences between 
these  two  country  groups,  but  also  in  country  groups 
regarding the different forms of political changes. 
In this context, the authors identify four types of political 
changes of the regime: 
1. political  regime  changes  –  from  democratic  to 
authoritarian and vice versa; 
2. government  authority  changes  –  from  one 
authoritarian government to another; 
3. changes  of  a  political  party  –  without  a  regime 
change; 
4. changes  in  government  structure  –  changes  of  the 
Prime Minister. 
4. Measuring Central Bank Independence  
and Inflation Targeting in Developed  
and Developing Countries 
The  new  index  for  central  bank  independence  and 
inflation targeting that I built up is conceived as a sum of 
numerical  values  assigned  to  thirty  eight  institutional 
arrangements both in law and practice of central banks: 
nine attributes each for  political and  legal central bank 
independence,  fifteen  attributes  for  central  bank 
governance and conduct of monetary policy and fourteen 
attributes  for  central  bank  transparency  and 
accountability.  These  three  groups,  namely  political  an 
legal  central  bank  independence,  central  bank 
governance and conduct of monetary policy and central 
bank transparency and accountability take a maxim value 
of 10  each, and gives a maximum aggregated of 10 for 
the new index of central bank independence and inflation 
targeting.  This  index  can  be  called  a  weighted  index  of 
central bank independence and inflation targeting with a 
scale of 0 – 10, since attributes are weighted unequally. 
The  score  assigned  to  each  criterion  is  aggregated  to 
obtain the final value of the index. The higher the value 
assigned to each criterion, the higher will be the maximum 
score of the index. Appendix A presents the variables of 
the index and their coding. 
This  index  is  better  considered  as  a  de  facto  or  actual 
index rather than a de jure one because the aggregated 
value  is  based  on  the  actual  institutional  practices  or 
norms of central banks and not necessarily what is written 
in  the  central  bank  laws.  However,  the  new  index  for 
central bank independence and inflation targeting is an 
interpretation  based  on  these  laws,  which  are  put  into 
actual  practices  and  those  practices  that  are  not 
stipulated by law. 
In  order  to  observe  the  soundness  of  the  index  for 
measuring  central  bank  independence  and  inflation 
targeting  (ICBIIT)  that  I  have  constructed,  it  is  very 
important to measure this index in developed countries 
and in developing countries. For a more comprehensive 
analyses and for viewing the reasons for the different level 
of  central  bank  independence  and  inflation  targeting  I 
have built up three country groups: developed countries, 
developing countries and less developed countries.  
Measuring central bank independence  
and inflation targeting in developed countries 
Table  2  presents  the  result  of  measuring  central  bank 
independence  and  inflation  targeting  in  developed 
countries3. Regarding the first pillar,  political  and  legal 
central  bank  independence,  the  results  are  as  follows: 
                                                 
3 The developed country group consists in 20 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Canada,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Iceland,  Israel, 
Japan,  Luxemburg,  Malta,  Great  Britain,  Norway,  New  Zeeland,  Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and USA.    Florin Cornel DUMITER 
France  is  in  the  first  place  with  9.44  points  –  a  high 
degree of political and legal central bank independence 
due to the six year term of the central bank Governor and 
the Governing Board, a lower level of the turn over rate of 
the  central  bank  governor  (0.13)  and  a  non  –  political 
vulnerability. The central bank Governor cannot hold any 
other office in the Government and it can be dismissed 
only through the vote of the Governing Council. Regarding 
the  Governing  Board,  their  members  are  non  – 
government  persons,  most  of  them  being  appointed  by 
the President of the Republic and by the President of the 
National Assembly. 
Regarding the first pillar of the ICBIIT we can identify on 
the  second  place  with  8.88  points  three  countries: 
Denmark,  Luxemburg  and  USA.  Analyzing  the  term  of 
central bank Governor and the members of the Governing 
Board  we  can  identify  some  differences:  in  Denmark 
central bank Governor has an unlimited tenure – limited 
by the age 70 – he it is obliged to send in the resignation 
before the expiration of the month in which he turns 70 
years  old;  the  tenure  of  the  central  bank  Governor  of 
Luxemburg is six years and the central bank Governor of 
the USA is 14 years. 
A common feature of these countries is the non – political 
vulnerability and a lower turnover rate of the central bank 
Governors: Denmark (0.16), Luxemburg and USA (0.12), 
the fact that the central bank Governor cannot hold other 
  Table 2 
Measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting in developed countries1 
 
Country  PLCBI2  Ranking 
PLCBI3  CBGCMP4  Ranking 
CBGCMP5  CBTA6  Ranking 
CBTA7  ICBIIT8  Ranking 
ICBIIT9 
Austria  6  11  9,33  1  8,93  4  8,09  13 
Belgium  8,55  3  9  2  9,29  3  8,95  4 
Canada  7,55  5  6,67  6  10  1  8,07  14 
Denmark  8,88  2  7,8  3  8,93  4  8,54  9 
France  9,44  1  9,33  1  9,64  2  9,47  1 
Germany  7,22  6  9,33  1  9,64  2  8,73  7 
Great Britain  8,33  4  7,13  4  9,64  2  8,37  11 
Greece  6,66  8  9,33  1  10  1  8,66  8 
Ireland  8,55  3  9,33  1  9,64  2  9,17  2 
Iceland  5,11  12  7  5  8,57  5  6,89  17 
Israel  5,11  12  9,33  1  9,29  3  7,91  15 
Japan  4,33  13  4,33  9  5,71  7  4,79  19 
Luxemburg  8,88  2  9  2  8,93  4  8,94  5 
Malta  6,55  9  9,33  1  9,29  3  8,39  10 
Norway  6,11  10  5  7  9,64  2  6,92  18 
New Zeeland  7,11  7  4,66  8  10  1  7,26  16 
Spain  8,33  4  9,33  1  9,64  2  9,10  3 
Sweden  9,44  1  7  5  10  1  8,81  6 
Switzerland  6,11  10  9  2  9,29  3  8,13  12 
USA  8,88  2  7,13  4  8,21  6  8,07  14 
   
Note:  1 Measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting in developed countries was made by analyzing central 
banks websites, government websites, central bank laws and statutes, different norms and regulation and other 
publications and studies available on the central banks website and on the real practices of the developed central banks 
in the period between 1980 and 2009. 
           2  PLCBI – Political and legal central bank independence. 
           3 Ranking PLCBI – Ranking of the developed central banks by the pillar of political and legal central bank independence. 
          4 CBGCMP – Central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy.        
          5  Ranking CBGCMP – Ranking of the developed central banks by the pillar central bank governance and conduct of 
monetary policy.  
                 6 CBTA – Central bank transparency and accountability. 
          7  Ranking CBTA – Ranking of the developed central banks by the pillar central bank transparency and accountability. 
          8  ICBIIT – Index for central bank independence and inflation targeting and represents the sum of the three pillars 
mentioned above. 
          9  Ranking ICBIIT – Ranking of the developed central banks by the total scoring of the Index for central bank independence 
and inflation targeting. 
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office  in  the  Government  and  the  non  –  government 
statute of the central bank board members. 
Belgium and Ireland are in the third place in the top of the 
developed  countries  with  8.55  points,  these  countries 
most important elements have been the non – political 
vulnerability and a lower turnover rate of the central banks 
Governors:  Belgium  (0.10)  and  Ireland  (0.13).  The 
common  characteristics  of  these  countries  are:  the                      
non  –  government  statute  of  the  board  members, 
appointment  of these members by the  King in  Belgium 
and  by  the  Banking  Association  in  Ireland,  and  the 
difference: the 5  years tenure of the  Belgium Governor 
and  the  7  years  tenure  of  the  Ireland  Governor,  the  6 
years tenure of the Belgium Board Members and the 5 
years term of the Ireland Board members. 
In the fourth place are Great Britain and Spain with 8.33 
points; the term of office of the central bank Governor of 
England is 5 years and of the Board members is 3 years, 
with the possibility of reappointment for another tenure; 
the Queen of England appoints the central bank Governor 
and the Bank of England has the authority to dismiss the 
Governor; the members of the Governing Board are non – 
government  persons  and  appointed  by  the  Queen  of 
England and by the Governor. Regarding Spain, the tenure 
of the central bank Governor and the Governing board is 
six  years,  with  possibility  of  reappointed  just  once;  the 
King is responsible for the appointing of the Governor and 
Board for the dismissal and the Board members are non – 
government persons appointed by the Government. Both 
countries have lower turn over rates of the central bank 
Governor: Great Britain (0.10) and Spain (0.13) and non – 
political vulnerability. 
At the middle of the hierarchy regarding the first pillar of 
the ICBIIT we can identify countries like: Canada  - 7.55 
points,  Germany  –  7.22  points,  New  Zeeland  –  7.11 
points, Greece – 6.66 points, Malta – 6.55 points, Norway 
– 6.11 points and Switzerland with 6.11 points. 
At the end of the list of the developed countries regarding 
the first pillar are: Austria – 6 points, Israel and Iceland 
with 5.11 points and Japan with 4.33 points. The lower 
level of the political and legal central bank independence 
of these countries is due to the government intervention in 
appointing and dismissal procedures of the Governor and 
the  central  bank  Board,  as  well  as  for  the  political 
vulnerability of the central bank Governor. 
The second pillar of the ICBIIT, Central bank governance 
and conduct of the monetary policy, has the highest score 
in  the  following  countries:  Austria,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Malta and Spain with 9.33 points. 
The  common  feature  of  these  countries  is  the 
membership  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks 
(ESCB) and of the Euro Zone, countries characterized by 
an explicit prioritization of the price stability objective, as 
the first objective of the monetary policy, the high degree 
of  goal  independence,  monetary  policy  targets  and  in 
establishing and using the monetary policy instruments, 
the central bank authority in establishing and managing 
the interest rate and the exchange rate, the central bank 
prevalence over government in case of policy conflict, and 
the explicit interdiction of government lending. 
The countries which can be identified in the middle of the 
developed  group  are:  Belgium,  Switzerland  and 
Luxemburg - 9 points, Denmark – 7,8 points, Great Britain 
and USA with 4 points, Iceland and Sweden with 7 points. 
The  countries  with  the  lowest  level  of  central  bank 
governance and conduct of monetary policy are: Canada – 
6.67  points,  Norway  –  5  points,  New  Zeeland  –  4.66 
points and Japan – 4.33 points due to the government 
participation in the formulation and implementation of the 
monetary policy and in regulating and implementing the 
exchange rate, the availability of government lending and 
the participation of the central bank in the primary market 
of government securities. 
The countries with the best score regarding the third pillar 
of  ICBIIT,  central  bank  transparency  and  accountability, 
are: Canada, Greece, New Zeeland and Sweden with 10 
points. In these countries, we can see a high degree of 
central bank accountability and transparency due to the 
explicit  stipulation  of  the  price  stability  objective,  the 
quantification  of  the  final  objective  of  monetary  policy, 
presentation and analyzing the monetary policy models, 
the  availability  of  the  time  series  for  the  most  relevant 
macroeconomic  variables  but  also  the  presentation  an 
explanation of the monetary policy actions, the monetary 
policy decision and the adopted and the coming measures 
– all these action are possible due to the adoption and the 
practicing the inflation targeting strategy. 
However, it can be identified countries with a high degree 
of central bank transparency and accountability: France, 
Germany,  Ireland,  Great  Britain,  Norway,  Spain  -  9.64 
points,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  Israel,  Malta  with  9.29 
points and Austria, Denmark, Luxemburg with 8.93 points; 
these countries have a very transparent monetary policy, 
offering  to  the  public  the  means  and  the  tools  for  the 
perception and the understanding of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. 
The developed countries with the lowest level of central 
bank transparency and accountability are: Island – 8.57 
points, USA with 8.21 points and Japan with 5.71 points. It 
can be noticed that Japan has the lowest level of central 
bank transparency and accountability due to the eviction 
of public communication, lack of presenting and analyzing 
monetary policy decisions and actions, and missing time 
series for the macroeconomic variables public availability 
on the central bank website. 
The final scoring of the ICBIIT is the following: first place 
France – 9.47 points followed closely by Ireland – 9.17 
points and Spain – 9.10 points. In the middle position of 
the  developed  countries’  group  are:  Belgium  –  8.95 
points, Luxemburg – 8.94 points, Sweden – 8.81 points, 
Germany – 8.73 points, Greece – 8.66 points, Denmark –    Florin Cornel DUMITER 
8.54  points,  Malta  –  8.39  points,  Great  Britain  –  8.37 
points, Switzerland – 8.13 points, Austria – 8.09 points 
and  Canada  with  8.07  points.  The  developed  countries 
with  the  lowest  scoring  of  the  ICBIIT  are:  Israel  –  7.91 
points, New Zeeland – 7.26 points, Iceland – 6.89 points, 
Norway – 6.92 points and Japan with 4.79 points. 
Calculating the average of the three ICBIIT several results 
can be seen: 7.36 points of the political and legal central 
bank independence for the developed country group, 7.92 
points  of  the  central  bank  governance  and  conduct  of 
monetary policy for the developed countries, 9.21 points 
of  the  central  bank  transparency  and  conduct  of 
monetary policy for the developed countries and a total 
scoring of 8.16 points for the ICBIIT. Taking into account 
these results it can be shown that the developed countries 
have  a  high  degree  of  central  bank  independence  and 
inflation  targeting,  with  a  remarkably  high  degree  of 
concentration at the top of the hierarchy. 
Measuring Central Bank Independence  
and Inflation Targeting in Developing Countries 
The results of measuring ICBIIT in developing countries4 
are presented in the  table  3;  regarding  the  first  pillar, 
political and legal central bank independence, Bosnia – 
Herzegovina has the highest score – 9.44 points due to 
the six years term of the tenure of central bank Governor 
and the Governing Board, appointment of the Governor by 
                                                 
4  The  group  of  developing  countries  consists  in  20  countries:  Albania, 
Armenia,  Belarus,  Bosnia  –  Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech 
Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Macedonia,  Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine. 
  Table 3 
Measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting in developing countries1 
 
Country  PLCBI2  Ranking 
PLCBI3  CBGCMP4  Ranking 
CBGCMP5  CBTA6  Ranking 
CBTA7  ICBIIT8  Ranking 
ICBIIT9 
Albania  6,66  9  8,66  2  8,93  3  8,08  5 
Armenia  6,33  10  7,13  6  8,93  3  7,46  9 
Belarus  6,33  10  5  13  7,14  6  6,16  17 
Bosnia - Herzegovina  9,44  1  7,66  4  5,36  8  7,49  8 
Bulgaria  6,66  9  6,13  11  6,79  7  6,53  14 
Croatia  6,66  9  7,66  4  4,64  9  6,32  16 
Czech Republic  8,33  3  7,33  5  8,93  3  8,20  3 
Estonia  7,11  7  8  3  6,79  7  7,30  10 
Hungary  7  8  7,66  4  9,64  1  8,10  4 
Latvia  8,88  2  7  7  5,36  8  7,08  11 
Lithuania  7,44  6  7,66  4  4,64  9  6,58  13 
Macedonia  8,88  2  7,33  5  7,50  5  7,90  6 
Moldova  8,88  2  7,33  5  8,93  3  8,38  2 
Poland  7,77  5  6,33  10  8,93  3  7,68  7 
Romania  8,22  4  8  3  8,93  3  8,38  2 
Russia  5,55  12  5,33  12  8,57  4  6,48  15 
Serbia  4,55  13  6,47  9  9,64  1  6,89  12 
Slovakia  7,11  7  9  1  9,29  2  8,47  1 
Turkey  3,77  14  6,67  8  9,29  2  6,58  13 
Ukraine  6  11  4,33  14  4,64  9  4,99  18 
   
Note:  1 Measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting in developing countries was made by analyzing central 
banks websites, government websites, central bank laws and statutes, different norms and regulation and other 
publications and studies available on the central banks website and on the real practices of the developed central banks 
in the period between 1980 and 2009. 
           2 PLCBI – Political and legal central bank independence. 
           3 Ranking PLCBI – Ranking of the developing central banks by the pillar of political and legal central bank independence. 
           4 CBGCMP – Central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy.        
          5   Ranking CBGCMP – Ranking of the developing central banks by the pillar central bank governance and conduct of 
monetary policy.  
                6 CBTA – Central bank transparency and accountability. 
                7  Ranking CBTA – Ranking of the developing central banks by the pillar central bank transparency and accountability. 
                8  ICBIIT – Index for central bank independence and inflation targeting and represents the sum of the three pillars 
mentioned above. 
                9  Ranking ICBIIT – Ranking of the developing central banks by the total scoring of the Index for central bank independence 
and inflation targeting. 
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the International Monetary Fund, an lower turn over rate 
of  central  bank  Governor  (0.14),  non  –  political 
vulnerability and a non – politic statute of the Governing 
Board members. With a high degree of political and legal 
central bank independence are also countries like: Latvia, 
Macedonia, and Moldova with 8.88 points. 
At the middle of the hierarchy of the first pillar of the ICBIIT 
for  the  developing  countries  observed  can  be  countries 
like:  Czech  Republic  –  8.33  points,  Romania  –  8.22 
points,  Poland  –  7.77  points,  Lithuania  –  7.44  points, 
Slovakia and Estonia – 7.11 points and Hungary with 7 
points. The common features of these countries are: the 
average tenure of five years of the central bank Governor 
and Governing  Board members  who are appointed and 
dismissed  by  Parliament  or  President,  a  non  –  political 
statute  of  the  Governing  Board  members,  a  lower  turn 
over  rate  of  the  central  bank  Governor  and  a  non  – 
political vulnerability. 
Central banks with the lowest score are: Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia  with  6.66  points,  Armenia  and  Belarus  –  6.33 
points, Ukraine – 6 points, Russia – 5.55 points, Serbia – 
4.55  points  and  Turkey  with  3.77  points  due  to  the 
following  elements:  terms  of  offices  between  4  and  5 
years of the central bank Governor and Governing Board 
members,  Governor  appointed  by  the  Government, 
turnover  rate  of  central  bank  Governor  very  high  (over 
0.33) and  on average  political  – vulnerability of central 
bank Governors. 
The second pillar of the ICBIIT, Central bank governance 
and conduct of monetary policy, applied to the developing 
countries  has  generated  the  following  results:  with  9 
points, Slovakia has the highest score, country member of 
the ESCB and Euro Zone, country with the single monetary 
policy,  a  high  goal  independence  and  instrument 
independence, a high prevalence over the Government in 
case  of  policy  conflicts  and  restriction  of  any  type  of 
government lending. 
At  the  middle  of  the  hierarchy  regarding  central  bank 
governance and conduct of monetary policy in developing 
countries  it  can  be  seen  countries  like:  Albania  –  8.66 
points,  Estonia  and  Romania  –  8  points,  Bosnia  – 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary with 7.66 points, 
Macedonia,  Moldova  and  Czech  Republic  with  7.33 
points,  Armenia  –  7.13  points,  Latvia  –  7  points  and 
Turkey – 6.67 points. These countries have price stability 
as the first monetary policy objective, most of them having 
adopted the inflation targeting strategy and gaining a high 
instrument independence and an autonomous exchange 
rate  managing,  in  most  countries  direct  and  indirect 
government lending  are strictly forbidden;  regarding the 
regulations, decisions and intervention on the exchange 
market the decision are decided either by the central bank 
or jointly with the government. 
Serbia with 6.47 points, Poland with 6.33 points, Bulgaria 
– 6.13 points, Russia – 5.33 points, Belarus – 5 points 
and Ukraine with 4.33 points are countries with the lowest 
level of central bank governance and conduct of monetary 
policy in the group of developing countries. This fact is due 
to  the  adoption  of  other  monetary  policy  strategies  as: 
monetary  targeting  or  exchange  rate  targeting,  Govern-
ment interference in establishing monetary policy objec-
tives  and  targets,  the  government  prevalence  over  the 
central bank in cases of policy conflicts, establishing the 
regulations, interventions in the exchange market by the 
central bank jointly with the government as well as grant-
ing  government  lending  in  favourable  terms  for  the 
government. 
Regarding the third pillar of the ICBIIT in developing coun-
tries, central bank transparency and accountability, Ser-
bia and Hungary have the highest score – 9.64 points. 
This is due the fact of adopting inflation targeting strategy 
in both countries, a high degree of transparency in com-
municating the monetary policy objectives and targets, a 
high  availability  of  the  macroeconomic  variables  time 
series and the macroeconomic models used for analyzing 
the monetary policy but due to the explanations and justi-
fications of the monetary policy decisions and actions. 
Identified  can  be  a  high  degree  of  central  bank 
transparency  and  accountability  in  some  developing 
countries as: Slovakia and Turkey – 9.33 points, Albania, 
Armenia, Moldova, Poland, Czech Republic and Romania 
with  8.93  points  and  Russia  with  8.57  points.  Most  of 
these  countries  have  adopted  the  inflation  targeting 
strategy  which  has  conducted  to  a  more  responsible 
monetary policy over the monetary policy objectives and 
targets, a better communication between the central bank 
and the public and press, publishing and presenting the 
projection, assumptions and forecasting over inflation and 
output and a public availability of the time series for the 
most comprehensive macroeconomic variables. However, 
it can be observed a weak point of these countries – the 
public  availability  absence  of  the  main  macroeconomic 
models used for the monetary policy analysis.  
The developing countries with the lowest degree of central 
bank transparency and accountability are: Macedonia – 
7.50 points, Belarus – 7.14 points, Bulgaria and Estonia – 
7 points, Bosnia – Herzegovina and Latvia – 5.36 points, 
Croatia,  Lithuania  and  Ukraine  with  4.64  points.  These 
countries are characterized through a monetary policy of 
those parameters are not available to the public, a lack o 
public  availability  of  the  main  macroeconomic  models 
used  for  the  monetary  policy  analysis,  a  lower 
communication  with  the  public  and  the  missing 
explanations and justifications over the monetary policy 
actions and decisions. 
The final hierarchy and score of the ICBIIT in developing 
countries is as follows: first place  – Slovakia  with 8.47 
points,  followed  closely  by  Moldova  and  Romania  with 
8.38  points,  Czech  Republic  with  8.20  points,  Hungary 
with 8.10 points, Bosnia – Herzegovina – 7.49 points, Ar-
menia – 7.46 points, Estonia – 7.30 points and Latvia – 
7.08  points.  The  developing  countries  with  the  lowest    Florin Cornel DUMITER 
score of central bank transparency and accountability are: 
Serbia – 6.89 points, Lithuania and Turkey – 6.58 points, 
Bulgaria  –  6.53  points,  Russia  –  6.48  points,  Croatia  – 
6.32  points,  Belarus  –  6.16  points  and  Ukraine  –  4.99 
points. 
Calculating the average of the three ICBIIT pillars several 
results can be observed: 7.08 points of the political and 
legal central bank independence for the developing coun-
try group, 7.03 points of the central bank governance and 
conduct of monetary policy for the developing countries’ 
group, 7.64 points of the central bank transparency and 
accountability  for  the  developing  countries’  group  and 
7.25 points of the overall ICBIIT. Taking into account these 
results it can be shown that the developing countries have 
middle – high level of central bank independence and in-
flation targeting with a remarkable degree of concentra-
tion in the middle of the hierarchy. 
Measuring Central Bank Independence  
and Inflation Targeting in Less Developed Countries 
Table  4  presents  the  result  of  measuring  central  bank 
independence  and  inflation  targeting  in  the  less 
developing  country  group.  Regarding  the  first  pillar, 
political and legal central bank independence, the highest 
score in the less developing countries group has Mexico - 
8.88  points  due  to  the  6  years  tenure  of  central  bank 
  Table 4 





PLCBI3  CBGCMP4  Ranking 
CBGCMP5  CBTA6  Ranking 
CBTA7  ICBIIT8  Ranking 
ICBIIT9 
Argentina  4,44  12  7,40  2  5,71  6  5,85  11 
Botswana  5,55  9  6,47  9  3,21  11  5,08  18 
Brazil  3  16  4,13  14  8,57  3  5,23  17 
Chile  6,33  6  7  5  9,64  1  7,66  2 
Ghana  5,77  8  7,80  1  8,93  2  7,50  3 
Jordan  4,11  13  5,33  12  2,14  12  3,86  20 
Jamaica  4,11  13  7  5  4,64  9  5,25  16 
Malaysia  5,55  9  5,60  10  5  8  5,38  14 
Mexico  8,88  1  5  13  6,79  4  6,89  5 
Namibia  6  7  6,8  7  3,57  10  5,47  13 
Nepal  3,77  14  6,73  8  3,21  11  4,57  19 
Philippines   8  2  7,33  3  8,93  2  8,09  1 
Ruanda  5,33  10  6,93  6  5,36  7  5,87  10 
Saudi Arabia  6,77  5  5,47  11  3,57  10  5,27  15 
South Africa  4,88  11  4,13  14  8,93  2  5,98  9 
Sri Lanka  7  4  6,47  9  3,21  10  5,56  12 
Tailanda  3,33  15  7,33  3  9,64  1  6,77  7 
Tanzania  7,44  3  7,13  4  6,07  5  6,88  6 
Trinidad Tobago  6,33  6  7,80  1  5,36  7  6,50  8 
Zambia  4,44  12  7,33  3  8,93  2  6,90  4 
   
Note:  1 Measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting in less developed countries was made by analyzing central 
banks websites, government websites, central bank laws and statutes, different norms and regulation and other 
publications and studies available on the central banks website and on the real practices of the developed central banks 
in the period between 1980 and 2009. 
           2 PLCBI – Political and legal central bank independence. 
           3 Ranking PLCBI – Ranking of the less developed central banks by the pillar of political and legal central bank 
independence. 
           4 CBGCMP – Central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy.        
          5   Ranking CBGCMP – Ranking of the less developed central banks by the pillar central bank governance and conduct of 
monetary policy.  
                6 CBTA – Central bank transparency and accountability. 
                7  Ranking CBTA – Ranking of the less developed central banks by the pillar central bank transparency and accountability. 
                8  ICBIIT – Index for central bank independence and inflation targeting and represents the sum of the three pillars 
mentioned above. 
                9  Ranking ICBIIT – Ranking of the less developed central banks by the total scoring of the Index for central bank 
independence and inflation targeting. 
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Governor  and  the  8  years  tenure  of  the  central  bank 
Governing Board, a very low turn over rate of central bank 
Governor (0.08), a non - political vulnerability, the non – 
government  statute  of  the  Board  members  and  the 
appointment  of  the  members  of  the  Board  by  the 
President  of the Republic.  Higher levels of political  and 
legal central bank independence can be observed in other 
countries, namely: Philippines - 8 points, Tanzania - 7.44 
points and Sri Lanka with 7 points. 
At  the  middle  of  the  hierarchy  of  the  less  developed 
countries regarding the first pillar of the ICBIIT are: Saudi 
Arabia with 6.77 points, Chile and Trinidad Tobago – 6.33 
points,  Namibia  –  6  points,  Ghana  –  5.77  points  and 
Botswana with 6.55 points. The lower level of political and 
legal central bank independence in these countries is due 
to  the  relatively  low  turn  over  rate  of  central  bank 
Governor and a political vulnerability, more precisely, the 
tenure of the central bank Governor is lower than the one 
stipulated in the central banks charter and it appears after 
a change in the political regime or in an electoral cycle. 
The countries with the lowest degree of political and legal 
central bank independence are:  Ruanda with 5.33 points, 
South Africa – 4.88 points, Argentina and Zambia – 4.44 
points, Nepal – 3.77 points, Thailand – 3.33 points and 
Brazil – 3 points. The reasons behind these lower levels of 
political and legal central bank independence are: a lower 
tenure  of  central  bank  Governor  and  of  the  Governing 
Board members, Government interference in appointment 
and dismissal procedures of central bank Governor and 
the Governing Board members, higher turnover rates of 
central bank Governor (over 1) and political vulnerability of 
the central bank Governor. 
The second pillar of the ICBIIT, central bank governance 
and  conduct  of  monetary  policy,  applied  in  the  less 
developed  countries  group  had  generated  the  following 
results - the countries with the highest score are : Ghana 
and  Trinidad  Tobago  –  7.80  points,  Argentina  –  7.40 
points, Philippines, Thailand and Zambia – 7.33 points, 
Tanzania – 7.13 points, Chile and Jamaica – 7 points. The 
satisfactory  levels  of  central  bank  governance  and 
conduct of monetary policy in these countries are due to 
the  high  central  bank  goal,  target  and  instrument 
independence,  the  prevalence  of  the  central  bank  in 
cases of policy conflicts and the central bank autonomy in 
managing the exchange rate policy. 
At  the  middle  of  the  hierarchy  in  the  less  developed 
country  group  of  the  second  pillar  of  the  ICBIIT  are: 
Ruanda – 6.93 points, Namibia – 6.80 points, Nepal – 
6.73 points, Botswana and Sri Lanka – 6.47, Malaysia – 
5.60 points and Saudi Arabia – 5.47 points. These lower 
levels are due to the multiple monetary policy objectives 
without  any  prioritisation,  the  Government  influence  in 
establishing  the  monetary  policy  objectives  and  targets 
and granting direct and indirect Government lending. 
The countries at the end of the hierarchy are: Jordan – 
5.33 points, Mexico –  5 points, Brazil and South Africa – 
4.13 points. These countries are tracking a lower level of 
central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy 
because  of  several  facts:  the  governance  authority  in 
establishing  the  monetary  policy  objectives  and  targets, 
the  absolute  prevalence  of  the  Government  over  the 
central bank in policy conflicts situations, the Government 
interference in regulation and application of the exchange 
rate  and  the  lax  conditions  of  the  direct  and  indirect 
Government lending. 
Referring  to  the  third  pillar  of  the  ICBIIT,  central  bank 
transparency  and  accountability  in  the  developing 
countries it can be seen that Chile and Thailand with 9.64 
points  are  leaders,  followed  closely  by:  South  Africa, 
Ghana  and  Zambia  –  8.93  points  and  Brazil  with  8.57 
points. The higher level of central bank transparency and 
accountability, level which is similar to the developed and 
developing  countries,  is  given  by  the  adoption  of  the 
inflation targeting strategy which is preferred in most of 
the  less  developed  countries.  It  can  be  noticed  that 
countries  which  have  adopted  the  inflation  targeting 
strategy  register  a  high  degree  of  central  bank 
transparency  and  accountability  through  the  public 
availability  of  the  information  and  of  the  time  series 
macroeconomic  variables,  presenting  its  own 
macroeconomic  forecasts  for  inflation  and  output  and 
explaining and justifying the monetary policy present and 
future decisions. 
The  second  group  of  countries  is  at  the  middle  of  the 
hierarchy  regarding  central  bank  transparency  and 
accountability:  Mexico  –  6.79  points,  Tanzania  –  6.07 
points,  Argentina  –  5.71  points,  Trinidad  Tobago  and 
Ruanda – 5.36 points, Malaysia - 5 points. The lower level 
of  these  countries  regarding  central  bank  transparency 
and accountability is due to the lack of quantification of 
the primary monetary policy objective, the eviction of the 
main  macroeconomic  models  use  for  monetary  policy 
analyzes  and  the  lack  of  the  macroeconomic  variables 
time series. 
Countries  with  the  lowest  levels  of  central  bank 
transparency  and  accountability  in  the  less  developed 
country group are: Jamaica – 4.64 points, Saudi Arabia – 
3.57 points, Botswana and Nepal with 3.21 points and 
Jordan with 2.14 points. As we can see, these countries 
have  lower  levels  of  central  bank  transparency  and 
accountability  due  to  several  factors  like:  the  monetary 
policy strategy adopted by these countries have a lack of 
monetary policy transparency: the central bank does not 
communicate  with  the  public  and  the  press,  monetary 
policy objectives and decisions are not clearly explained, 
justified and presented to the public, the lack of its own 
inflation and output forecasts and the missing auditing of 
the  financial  annual  situations  by  the  independent 
financial auditors.     Florin Cornel DUMITER 
Regarding the final hierarchy and scoring of the ICBIIT, the 
situation is as follows: on the first place is Phillipines with 
8.09  points,  followed  closely  by  countries  like:  Chile  – 
7.66 points, Ghana – 7.50 points, Mexico – 6.89 points. 
At the middle of the hierarchy are: Tanzania – 6.88 points, 
Thailand – 6.77  points, Trinidad Tobago  – 6.50  points, 
South  Africa  –  5.98  points,  Ruanda  –  5.87  points,  Sri 
Lanka – 5.56 points, and at the end of the hierarchy we 
can  observe  countries  like:  Namibia  –  5.47  points, 
Malaysia  –  5.38  points,  Saudi  Arabia  –  5.27  points, 
Jamaica – 5.25 points, Brazil – 5.23 points, Botswana – 
5.08  points,  Nepal  –  4.57  points  and  Jordan  –  3.86 
points. 
Calculating the average of the three ICBIIT pillars several 
results can be observed: 5.55 points of the political and 
legal  central  bank  independence  for  the  group  of  less 
developed  countries,  6.46  points  of  the  central  bank 
governance and conduct of monetary policy for the group 
of  less  developed  countries,  6.07  points  of  the  central 
bank transparency and accountability for the group of less 
developed countries and 6.47 points of the overall ICBIIT. 
Taking into account these results it can be shown that the 
less  developed  countries  have  a  lower  level  of  central 
bank  independence  and  inflation  targeting  with  a 
remarkable  concentration  in  the  final  section  of  the 
hierarchy. 
4. Conclusions 
The  empirically  observed  trend  towards  a  more 
independent  central  bank  and  an  efficient  inflation 
targeting regime is supported to a large extent by modern 
theory of monetary policy. The main idea of the different 
approaches is that central banks which are independent 
from government influence are able to reduce the inflation 
bias  without  having  to  implement  completely  inflexible 
rules. However, the monetary theory does not conclude 
that establishing an independent central bank alone leads 
to  an  improvement  in  social  welfare.  To  achieve  this, 
either the  preferences  of the independent central bank 
must  differ  from  those  of  the  government  in  an 
appropriate way, and / or the independently acting central 
bank  must  be  provided  with  policy  targets  or  incentive 
structures. 
Analyzing the economic literature regarding central bank 
independence and inflation targeting, and presenting and 
identifying  the  indices  for  measuring  central  bank 
independence, conducted to the need of setting up a new 
index  for  both  central  bank  independence  and  inflation 
targeting. In the economic literature there were indices for 
measuring  only  central  bank  independence  de  jure  for 
developed countries and de facto for emerging countries. 
The  index  for  central  bank  independence  and  inflation 
targeting  wants  in  the  first  place  to  eliminate  the 
differences  of  de  jure  and  de  facto  independence  for 
measuring  independence  both  for  developed  countries 
and emerging countries based on some legal aspect and 
of  some  actual  practice  and  behaviour  of  the  central 
banks.  In  the  second  place,  we  consider  that  inflation 
targeting  and  central  bank  independence  are  mutually 
reinforcing. By increasing central bank independence this 
fact  will  automatically  lead  to  an  increase  transparency 
and  accountability  of  the  central  bank,  conducting  to  a 
higher credibility of the central bank and automatically to 
an  efficient  inflation  targeting  regime.  Moreover,  an 
efficient  inflation  targeting  regime  can  increase  central 
bank  independence  through  an  explicit  target  and  a 
higher transparency of this monetary policy regime.  
The main purpose of this paper was to construct a new 
index  for  central  bank  independence  and  inflation 
targeting. In the economic literature there were indices for 
measuring  only  central  bank  independence  de  jure  for 
developed countries and de facto for emerging countries. 
The  index  for  central  bank  independence  and  inflation 
targeting  wants  in  the  first  place  to  eliminate  the 
differences  of  de  jure  and  de  facto  independence  for 
measuring  independence  both  for  developed  countries 
and emerging countries based on some legal aspect and 
of  some  actual  practice  and  behaviour  of  the  central 
banks.  In  the  second  place,  we  consider  that  inflation 
targeting  and  central  bank  independence  are  mutually 
reinforcing. By increasing central bank independence this 
fact will automatically lead to an increase in transparency 
and  accountability  of  the  central  bank,  conducting  to  a 
higher credibility of the central bank and automatically to 
an  efficient  inflation  targeting  regime.  Moreover,  an 
efficient  inflation  targeting  regime  can  increase  central 
bank  independence  through  an  explicit  target  and  a 
higher transparency of this monetary policy regime.  
The second purpose of this paper was measuring central 
bank  independence  and  inflation  targeting  in  three 
country groups establish by the author, namely: developed 
countries,  developing  countries  and  less  developed 
countries conducted to the following results: in developed 
countries we can observe a high degree of central bank 
political  and legal  independence;  is these countries the 
Governor and the members of the Governing Board have 
long tenures and overlap the political cycle, the Governor 
and  the  Board  members  are  non  –  political  persons, 
turnover rates of the central bank Governors are very low 
(beneath  0.16)  and  it  is  a  remarkably  non  –  political 
vulnerability.  Regarding  central  bank  governance  and 
conduct of monetary policy in the developed countries we 
can  see  a  high  degree  of  goal,  target  and  instrument 
independence, autonomous central bank in establishing 
and applying the interest rate and exchange rate policies 
and  the  strong  interdiction  of  direct  and  indirect 
government  lending.  Developed  countries  have  very 
transparent  and  accountable  central  banks  due  to  the 
availability of time series of macroeconomic variables and 
the macroeconomic models used for analyzing monetary 
policy,  the  continued  communication  between  central 
bank, public, press and enterprises, and the permanent 
explaining and justifying the monetary policy actions and 
decisions.  MEASURING CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION TARGETING  
IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
In  developing  countries  we  can  observe  a  satisfactory 
level  of  political  and  legal  central  bank  independence, 
characterized in average by lower turnover rates, a small 
government  interference  in  the  appointment  and 
dismissal procedures of the Governor and the Governing 
Board, but it can be also identified a political vulnerability 
in some of the developing countries. Central banks have a 
relatively  stable  autonomy  in  establishing  the  monetary 
policies regarding the exchange rate and interest rate, in 
establishing  the  monetary  policy  targets  in  conjunction 
with the government, but also some weakness remarked 
by  allowing  government  lending,  by  participating  in  the 
primary market for Government securities and performing 
the  supervision  function.  Almost  all  of  these  countries 
have  adopted  an  inflation  targeting  strategy,  strategy 
which has facilitated a better relationship with the public, 
media, private agents – all of these conducted to a high 
level of central bank transparency and accountability in 
the developing country group. 
In the less developing country group we can identify low 
levels of all the three pillar of the ICBIIT; the reason behind 
this  fact  is  the  strong  Government  influence  over  the 
central  bank  in  the  appointment  and  the  dismissal 
procedures of the Governor and of the Governing Board 
members, the prevalence of Government over the central 
bank in the conduct of monetary policy and establishing 
the  exchange  and  interest  rate  and  a  low  degree  of 
transparency and accountability by promoting the banking 
secrecy  and  the  lack  of  communicating  with  the  public 
and  the  private  agents  regarding  the  monetary  policy 
parameters, decisions and actions.  
Finally, I consider that the new index for measuring central 
bank independence and inflation targeting means that a 
central bank holds the legal power in order to protect from 
external  influence,  gains  a  high  degree  of  autonomy  in 
establishing  the  monetary  policy  and  implementing  its 
objectives  and  targets  without  any  government 
interference,  can  choose  and  use  its  optimal  monetary 
policy  instruments  for  controlling  prices,  inflation, 
exchange  rate  stability  and  restricting  central  bank 
accountability over the Parliament in order to keep more 
transparent its activities. 
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Appendix A 
Index of central bank independence and inflation targeting 
1.Central bank political and legal independence 
(a) Term of office of Governor (CEO)  
  - 6 years or more  10 points 
  - 5 years  7 points 
  - 4 years   5 points 
  - 3 years or less  3 points 
  - Not mentioned  0 points 
(b) Legal power to appoint the Governor (CEO) 
  - Board of the central bank  10 points 
  - Legislature / Parliament  5 points 
  - Executives / Government  0 points 
(c) Legal power to dismiss Governor (CEO) 
  - Board of the central bank  10 points 
  - Legislature / Parliament  5 points 
  - Executives / Government  0 points 
(d) Does Governor / CEO hold other office in the Government  
  - No – Governor / CEO does not  10 points 
  - Yes – He does  0 points 
(e) Turnover rate of Governor / CEO 
  - TOR is 0.16 or smaller   10 points 
  - TOR is 0.2 or smaller  7 points 
  - TOR is 0.25 or smaller  5 points 
  - TOR is 0.33 or smaller  3 points 
  - TOR is above 0.33  0 points  MEASURING CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION TARGETING  
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(f)Political vulnerability of Governor / CEO 
  - Political (if the Governor changed with 6 months of  
    political change)  0 points 
  - Non Political  10 points 
(g) Members of the Management Board of the central bank 
  - No government persons   10 points 
  - Not mentioned government or non – government  7 points 
  - Government Employees   5 points 
  - Government Ministers  0 points 
(h) Appointment of Board members 
  - Government appoints not more than half the members 
    of the board, or two different bodies, which really balanced  10 points 
    one another, respectively nominate and appoint the board 
    members, for instance; the ministry of finance nominates 
    and the legislature appoints   
  - Government appoints more than a half of all the members 
    of the board  0 points 
(i)Term of the Board Members 
  - The term is larger than 6 years and staggered   10 points 
  - The term is 5 years and staggered  7 points 
  - The term is 4 years and staggered  5 points 
  - The term is less than 4 years and staggered  3 points 
  - Not mentioned  0 points 
Maximum score of political and legal central bank independence = total score / 9 (the numbers of the criterion) → minimum level 
0 points, maximum level 10 points. 
2. Central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy 
(a) Price stability  
  - Is the main or only objective of the bank  10 points 
  - Price stability is one objective with other compatible objectives  7 points 
  - No objectives stated in the bank charter   5 points 
  - Stated objective do not include price stability  0 points 
(b) Monetary policy strategy 
  - Inflation targeting and forecasting by central bank  10 points 
  - Not done by the central bank  0 points 
(c) The degree of Goal and Target Independence 
  - The central bank alone sets the numerical goals or targets 
    for its objectives, for instance: monetary aggregates,  10 points 
    interest rates or inflation 
  - The central bank and the Government jointly set the goals 
    or targets for its objectives, for instance through a policy  5 points 
    target agreement  
  - The Government alone sets the targets for the objectives  0 points 
(d) The degree of Instrument independence  
  - The central bank alone sets the instruments of monetary  
    policy to achieve its objectives  10 points 
  - The central bank and the Government jointly set  
    the instruments of monetary policy  5 points 
  - The Government alone decides on setting instruments  0 points 
(e) General policy conflicts 
  - The central bank absolutely prevails over the Government 
    in case of policy conflicts  10 points 
  - The Government prevails over the central bank, subject to  
    due process and possible protest from latter   5 points 
  - The Government absolutely prevails over the central bank   0 points 
(f) Interest rate 
  - Interest rate setting and managed by central bank  10 points 
  - Not done by the central bank  0 points    Florin Cornel DUMITER 
(g) Intervention of foreign exchange market is decided by 
  - Central bank  10 points 
  - Jointly with the Government  5 points 
  - Government  0 points 
(h) Foreign exchange market regulation done by 
  - Central bank  10 points 
  - Jointly with the Government  5 points 
  - Government  0 points 
(i) Foreign exchange borrowings are decided by 
  - Central bank  10 points 
  - Jointly with the Government  5 points 
  - Government  0 points 
(j) Financial Supervision 
  - The banking supervision function is separated from the  
    central bank and entrusted to an autonomous Government  
    agency so that it will not impinge on monetary policy  10 points 
  - The banking supervision is jointly undertaken by the  
    central bank and a separate Government agency  5 points 
  - The function of monetary policy and banking supervision is 
    combined in a single institution, the central bank  0 points 
(k) Lending to the government 
  - Not permitted   10 points 
  - Permitted with strict limits (e.g. up to 15% of government 
    revenue)  7 points 
  - Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g. over 15% of  
    government revenue)  5 points 
  - No legal limits on lending  0 points 
(l) Terms of lending 
  - Controlled by the bank  10 points 
  - Specified by the bank charter  7 points 
  - Agreed between the central bank and Executive  5 points 
  - Decided by the executive branch alone  0 points 
(m) Maturity of loans 
  - Within 6 months  10 points 
  - Within 1 year  7 points 
  - More than 1 year  5 points 
  - Not mentioned in the law  0 points 
(n) Interest rates on loan must be 
  - At market rates or above minimum rate  10 points 
  - Below market rate  7 points 
  - Interest rate is not mentioned   5 points 
  - No interest on government borrowing  0 points 
(o) Central bank’s participation in the primary market for Government securities  
  -The central bank is prohibited from buying Government  
    securities from the primary market or if not prohibited,  
    central bank’s activity in the primary market is discretionary  10 points 
       voluntary   
    - The central bank is an active and involuntary buyer in the 
    primary market for Government securities  0 points 
 
Maximum score of central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy = total score / 15 (the numbers of the criterion) → 
minimum level 0 points, maximum level 10 points. 
3. Central bank transparency and accountability 
(a)  Is  a  formal  statement  of  the  objective(s)  of  monetary  policy  with  an  explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives 
  - One primary objective, or multiple objectives with  
    explicit priority  10 points  MEASURING CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION TARGETING  
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  - Multiple objective without prioritization  5 points 
  - No formal objective(s)  0 points 
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective  
  - Yes  10 points 
  - No  0 points 
(c) Are there explicit contracts in the similar institutional arrangements between the 
monetary authorities and the Government 
  - Central bank with explicit instrument independence or  
    central bank contract, although possibly subject to an  
    explicit override procedure  10 points 
  - Central bank without explicit instrument independence 
     or contract  5 points 
  - No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements  0 points 
(d)  Is  the  basic  economic  data  relevant  for  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  publicly 
available: money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization  
  - Quarterly time series for all five variables  10 points 
  - Quarterly time series for three or four out of five variables  5 points 
  - Quarterly time series for at most two out of five variables  0 points 
(e)  Does  the  central  bank  disclose  the  macroeconomic  model(s)  it  uses  for  policy 
analyses 
  - Yes  10 points 
  - No  0 points 
(f) Does central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts 
  - Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and  
    output for the medium term specify the assumptions about  10 points 
    the policy instrument 
  - Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and / or output 
    published at less than quarterly frequency  5 points 
  - No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output  0 points 
(g)  Are  decisions  about  adjustments  to  the  main  operating  instrument  or  target 
promptly  
  - Yes on the day of implementation  10 points 
  - No, or only after the day of implementation  0 points 
(h) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions   
  - Yes, always and including forward looking assessments  10 points 
  - Yes, when policy decisions change or only superficially  5 points 
  - No  0 points 
(i) Does the central bank disclose on explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting 
on an explicit indication or likely future policy acts at least quarterly 
  - Yes  10 points 
  - No  0 points 
(j) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its mainpolicytargets have 
been achieved 
  - Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target or 
    perfect control over the main operating instrument / target   10 points 
  - Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations  5 points 
  - No, or not very often – at less than annual frequency   0 points 
(k) Does the central bank regularly provide information on macroeconomic disturbances 
that affect the policy transmission process   
  - Yes, including a discussion of past forecasts errors  10 points 
  - Yes, but only through short – term forecasts or analysis of 
    current macroeconomic developments  5 points 
  - No, or not very often  0 points 
(l)  Does the  central  bank  regularly provide  an  evaluation  of  the  outcome  in  light of 
macroeconomic objectives    
  - Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary 
    policy in meeting the objectives  10 points    Florin Cornel DUMITER 
  - Yes, but superficially  5 points 
  - No, or not very often  0 points 
(m) Accountability of Governor / CEO 
  - Accountable to the Board  10 points 
  - Accountable to Parliament  5 points 
  - Accountable to Government  0 points 
(n) Is the central bank activities audited 
  - Yes  10 points 
  - No  0 points 
 
Maximum score of central bank transparency and accountability = total score / 15 (the numbers of the criterion) → minimum 
level 0 points, maximum level 10 points. 
 
Maximum score of central bank  independence and inflation targeting index = (total score of political and legal central bank 
independence + total score of central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy + total score of central bank transparency 
and accountability) / 3 (the numbers of the pillars) = minimum level 0 points, maximum level 10 points. 